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By increasing the cost of imports, minimum unit In other words, this system of administered
import reference prices not only generate the protection distorts domestic consumption and
usual distortions one expects from tariff protec- production.
tion but add new ones that a pure tariff system
would not generate. Using the case of Uruguay, Changanaquf and
Messerlin estimate what protection the reference
Reference prices substantially reduce the price procedures provide for Uruguayan indus-
price gap between imports with prices above and tries and analyze how this protection affects
below the reference price. By making "cheap" Uruguay's economy.
imports relatively more expensive than "expep-
sive" imports, reference prices affect quality in They show that the reference and minimum
ree ways that appear not to have been analyzed export price precedures impose floor prices on
before: imports that cover more than a third of value
added in Uniguayan manufacturing. The mini-
* They can induce foreign firms to shift mum export price system boosts published tariff
towad more expersive exports to the country rates for covered goods by 7 percent (probably
with reference pices. an underestimate) and the reference system
boosts them 18 percent.
* They can induce domestic producers in that
country to shift production toward lower-quality, These systems jeopardize trade liberalization
cheaper goods. efforts by creating the impression that tariff cuts
are greater than they really are. These systems
* Because this decreases the relative price of also create massive distortions (from 15 to 30
the expe'sive varieties, domestic consumers may percent) between the relative domestic prices of
lean toward buying more expensive goods. imported goods above and below the floor
prices.
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1. In o
Many developing countries increase the extent of protection granted to domsic industries by
imposing tariffs based on minimum unit import reference prices rather than the stated c.i.f. import
transaction invoice prices. Reference prices are often used to counter ise underinvoicing of imports that
is generally triggered by other existing protectionist measures in high-protection countries, as for instance
in Perdl and Cote d'Ivoire in the mid-80s. Reference prices also form part of trade liberalization
programs, as an instrument aimed at reducing shocks associated with the opening of an economy, as for
instance during the Mexican trade liberalization: in 1985. Finally, reference prices are also used as a
substitute for anti-dumping measures, as for instance in Uruguay since 1981.
The economic costs of reference prices, however, have not been extensively analyzed. These
economic costs can be decomposed into two main components. First, reference prices magnify the tariff
protection against imports whose prices are lower than the corrr-ponding reference prices. This price
augmentation effect generates the usual distortions analyzed in traditional trade theory. Second, for each
product, reference prices substantially reduce the price differendals between the varieties of imports with
prices lower and higher than the reference price. By making the cheap imported variety relatively more
expensive than the expensive variety, reference prices introduce a distortion that is likely to have adverse
quality effects, a phenomenon we believe has not been analyzed in the trade literature. Io this respect,
it is intuitively clear that reference price procedures have three quality-related effects: 1) they can induce
foreign firms to shift exports to the country toward the expensive varieties; 2) they can induce domestic
producers to shift pre-duction toward the cheap variedes; and 3) because these procedures decrease the
relative price of the expensive varieties, they can induce domestic consumets to reallocate expenditures
toward expensive goods. Hence, this system of administered protection has negative distributional effects
on the consumption side and also promotes the domestic production of low-quality domestic goods.
The purpose of the present study is to analyze the economic effects of reference prices, using the
Uruguayan case as an example. The study also presents estimates of the protection provided for
Uruguayan industries by the reference price procedures and analyzes the impact of this protection on the
Uruguayan economy. This study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical discussion of
the resource and welfare consequences of reference prices. After providing the necessary definitions for
reference prices, this section is divided in two parts. First, it takes the simplest possible approach by
2At the begwining of die Mexican trde liberalization in 1985, following the elimination of most quantitave mtriction, the
percentg coveage of production of tradables under reference pce. incraed from 18 pent to 25 percen, and mnained
at t level undil they were completel elmintd in 1987.
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assuming that consumers are Interested in the goods themselves and not in the services provided by these
goods. This allows us to suggest some elements for analyzing the impact of administered protection on
the structure of exports and on domestic production. Then we go a step further by assuming that
consumers are interested in the services provided by the goods, that is, they take into account the quality
of the goods imported or produced domestically. This extension allows us to compare the impact of
administered protection on the quality of imports and on incentives to alter the product mix with the
impact of other instruments of protection. Section 3 describes the coverage of the administered protection
by reference prices in Uruguay. It also provides empirical estimates of the main effects of reference price
procedures in Uruguay. In addition it shows that these empirical results are robust by examining in
greater detail the Uruguayan textiles sector and Uruguay's trade with Brazil and Argentina, the country's
two major trading partners. Finally, Section 4 presents the conclusions.
2. Theoreical Discussion ofbhe Resource and Welfare Consecuences of Minimum Prices
2.1 Definitions' and background. In general, a mechanism of reference prices works in the
following way: when the declared c.i.f. import price is less than the reference price (a floor price fixed
by regulation), the official duty is applied to the reference price. For transactions with a unit price higher
than the official floor price, the published tariff rate is applied to the declared shipment, so the apparent
(or published) and true (or actually paid) tariffs are the same. Thus, remedial measures are imposed only
on import shipments with a unit price lower than the official floor price.
The reference price mechanism is summarized by the following formula:
[1] P = p + tF,
wher3 P is the flnaL '-,estic price after imposition of the tariff to the corresponding reference price, p
Is the c.i.f. import p J declared by th importer, t is the nominal tariff rate, and F is the reference price
that the Uruguayan authorities consider to be the floor import price that should prevail (if F is less than
p, then as usual p is used for establishing the duties to be paid).
Another form of reference prio. system, that is even more powerfl as a protective measure, is
the so-called "minimum export price" mechanism. The minimum export price system not only levies the
tariff t on the arbitrarily determined minimum price F but also imposes a 'moving charge" (F-p) equal
to the difference between the minimum export price and the c.i.f. import price p declared by the
'Hero we define the referen¢e and minimum expost price mechanisms, the two najor tools of administered proteion in
unguay.
4importer. Thus, under the minimum export price system the domestic price in the importing country
would be:
[21 P = p + tF + (F - p) = F(l +t).
Clearly, the MEP is more restrictive than'the RP, in that F > p by definition.
One way to administer these so called reference prices has been to fix them in nominal terms,
as in Morocco, and not to itcrease them later on; in this way the ad valorem equivalent protection that
such prices offer is eroded over time by foreign inflation. A second way to administer the reference price
mechanism has been to use a procedure that allows frequent revisions in the level of the reference prices;
this is the approach taken in Uruguay and in various other developing countries.
2.2 Welfare costs of the RE and MEP systems. Assume for now that consumers demand goods
and thus ignore the impact of protection on the w.uality of imports and on the domestic production mix.
By increasing the cost of imports, the RP and MEP systems can be shown to generate the usual
distortions that one expects from tariff protection: domestic production is diverted from exportables to
importables. We first analyze the case of a Reference price system. Figure 1 shows foreign supply
(pW), domestic supply (pZS), and domestic demand (D) (for simplicity, only one-quality good is
considered.) In a free trade situation, the market would clear at W, vith a world price of p and quantity
sold equal to OL,. With the imposition of an ad-valorem tariff t, equilibrium would be attained at W',
where the price is p(l +t), and quantity sold is equal to 0L, (ON, from domestic suppliers and N1 .2 from
foreign suppliers.) As in the usual tariff-only case, the transfers to producers are equal to area a,
government tariff revenues are equal to area c + c', and the net effect is a loss to consumers equal to areas
b+d. However, the imposition of a reference price (equal to F) generates an effective supply curve of
pZY. The market clears at E, where the price is P= p+tF, and the quantity sold is OL, (ON2 fom
domestic suppliers and N2L, from foreign suppliers.) Since the reference price, the augmentation effect,
and the duty determine the domestic price, the system severely restricts competition in the domestic
market. In this case, we have extra efficiency losses equal to areas b'+d'. in addition, domestic
producers gain extra transfers equal to area a', and the government collects extra tariff revenue equal to
area c", but at the same time because of the reference price system, the government losses tariff revenue
equal to areas c'.
The minimum export price system can be analyzed in a similar fashion. Figure 2 shows foreign
supply (pW), domestic supply (pZS), and domestic demand (D). 'Me imposition of a MEP (equal to F)
generates an effective supply curve of pZY. The market clears at E, where the price is P= F(1 +t), and
the quantity sold is OL (ON from domestic suppliers and NL from foreign suppliers.) The quantity sold
sFigure 1
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by domestic producers is ON, and the rents that they capture equal the sum of areas a. The government
collects tariff revenue equal tc areas c+c, that includes the "moving charge" [(F-p) in equation 21 equal
to area c. However, these revenues are offset by the welfare loss to consumers equal to area PEWp.
The latter includes the higher prices paid for imports equal to the sum of areas c+c, the higher cost of
the domestic source of supply equal to area b, and the efficiency loss in consumption equal to area d.
Thus, the net effect is indicated by the sum of the areas b and d. In addition, because the Uruguayan
prieg remains unchanged, when the world price falls (curve pW shifts downward), the implicit ariff
equivalent of the MEP increases as world suppliers become more efficient.
6Figure 2
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that consumers buy goods for the services these goods provide. In such an approach, a crucial element
is the actual quality of the goods, which determines the features and longevity of the services provided.
In this vein, it is intuitively clear that minimum price procedures have three quality-related effects: 1)
tiey can induce foreign firms to shift exports to the country toward the expensive higher quality varieties;
2) they can induce domestic producers to shift production toward the cheap lower quality varieties; and
3) because these procedures decrease the reladve price of the expensive varieties, they can induce
domestic consumers to reallocate expenditures toward expensive goods. Hence, this system of
administered protection has negative distribudonal effects on the consumption side and also promotes
domestic production of low-quality goods.
This section refines these intuitive results and in the process extends the literature on the quality
effects of import quotas to cover the quality effects of minimum price procedures. Two main questions
are cxamined. First, what is the impact of the RP and MEP systems on the quality of the goods
7Imported, particularly when compared with the impact of an ad valorem tariff (hereafter tarift) or a
quota? Second, what are the consequences of the RP and MEP systems on the product mix of dosrestic
producers competing with fomeign producers subject o thes 3 procedures?
Foreign firms arc likely to react to the RP and ME1' procedures by changing the quality content
of the goods they export to Uruguay. Following the recent economic literature, one can analyze more
precisely the likely changes in the quality content per physical unit imported by considering two
alternative market structures:
a. 1lhe mp.AIflJ case: The first scenario is that foreign suppliers face competitive
markets, a case likely to fit most Uruguayan imports under RP or MEP procedures, whether they are
textiles or nontextile goods. Using a model suggested by Rodrfguez4 (1979), one can compare the inpact
of a tariff and that of a quota on import quality, and one can extend the results to a minimum price
system. The basic results are twofold: a tariff does not change the optimal quality content per physical
unit of imports, but a quota-and a minimum price as well-induces foreign firms to increase quality
content.
Under free trade, foreign exporters determine the optimal quality content per physical unit they
export by maximizing (with respect to o;, the quality content) their profits [pxq - xh(q)], where p is the
price per unit of services, x is the number of physical units produced, and xh(q) is the cost function
where h(q) is the constant average (and marginal) cost per unit of physical output. The optimal quality
content q, per physical unit under free trade is thus determined in the long run by
[31 p = h'(q).
The absence of entry barriers-zero profits-associated with long-run equilibrium in the competitive market
structure implies that in the aggregate
[41 p(S)S = Xh(q),
where p(S) is the demand for imports of services, and S = qX [where X=E(x)], the total flow of
services provided by the goods. The equilibrium situation is thus determined by
[51 p = h'(q) = h(q)/q,
that is, the traditional equality between marginal and average costs. Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the
model. Figure 3a shows the optimal quality content qF with a price per unit of services equal to PF, and
the total imports of services equal to Sp. Figure 3b illustrates the equilibrium situation F for the services
market.
'Sc abo Santoni and Van Cott (1980).
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Under a tariff, foreign firms maximize their profits defined by the expression [p(1-t)xq - xh(q)J,
the tariff being defined as imposed In the proportional amount t of the uariff-inclusive price. 'This yields
the optimal quality choice: p(l-) = h'(q). Under 'he zero-profit condition, the tariff solution yields p(l-
t) = h(q)/q, showing that profit-maximizing foreign exporters under a tariff face the same optimization
condition h'(q) = h(q)/q as under free trade when they determine the optimal quality content of their
products. They thus keep the optimal quality content qF per physical unit of their exports, which also
prevails under free trade. Nevertheless, keeping qp implies that the price per unit of service under a
tar.ff, PT, rises in proportion to the tariff up to PT=PFI(1-t) in figure 3b. In other words, a tariff d"'%
not induce foreign flrms to change the optimal quality content -Ner physical unit, but it reduces the total
amount of services imported from a level of ST (under free trade) to ST and the total volume of imported
goods from a level of Xp (under free trade) to XT.
By contrast, the introduction of a quota creates an incentive for foreign exporters to increase the
optimal quality content per physical unit. In order to make a meaningful comparison, the quota to be
considered is XT, as did the ad valorem tariff. This constraint is illustrated by the curve P(qXT), which
shows the domestic price per unit of services as the quality content is changed, XT being given and fixed.
If foreign firms would keep qFp , they would be able to charge a price pN while bearing a cost of h'(q)p
(at the margin). At that level of imports St , the domestic price is P,, with a rent equal to the difference
P;-P, accruing to quota holders. However, as long as each quota holder regards the domestic price for
services as given, it will pay for him to order imports of higher quality content whenever the price is
higher than the marginal cost. Foreign firms (suppliers) are thus induced to increase their revenues by
choosing a higher quality content, qQ , such as p = h'(q) for qQ (at the margin) as shown in Figure 3a.
As a result, as shown by the equilibrium point U in Figure 3b, the total imports of services increase up
to SQ, with SQ > ST.
The introduction of a minimum price, based on a RP or a MEP procedure, leads to a simiiar
quality upgrading reaction by foreign firms. In what follows, a minimum export price mechanisms
treated as a specific tariff, r, that is a function of the quality content of the imported good:
[61 r = r(q).
For prices up to the MEP, the higher the quality (and therefore unit price) the smaller the difference
between the arbitrary minimum export price and the declared c.i.f. import price. It is assumed that dr/dq
< 0, because the higher the quality, the lower the specific tariff. In such a case, fo.eign firms determine
the optimal quality content by maximizing their profits [pxq - xh(q) - xr(q)]. That gives
[3'1 p h'(q) + r'(q),
9Figure 3a Figure 3b
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illustrated by toe curve g'(q) in Figure 3a. Meanwhile, the zero-protit condition correspondlng to free
ent-y imposes
14'I p(S) = [h(q) + r(q)Iiq,
a condition illustrated by the curve g(q) in Figure 3a. As in the quota case, foreign firms are induced
to increase their optimal quality content. They will increase it up to qR, which is higher than qp and even
qQ. The total flow of services Increases up to SR, with Si > SQ > ST. In sum, a minimum price
heightens the incentive to increase the quality content of foreign exports.
h. The non-cogneAtve case: An alternative scenario is that foreign exporters are
monopolists, a case that may be less plausible than the previous one, but c.ne that nevertheless may fit
the situation of some Uruguayan imports. A model suggested by Krishna' (1987) leads to results quite
different fr' i those achieved under competition-that is, a tariff induces Che foreign monopolist to change
the optimal quality content, and a quota may lead to a lower quality content. After a brief survey of the
main results obtained by Krishna, the model is expanded to a minimum price situation.
The foreign monopolist's choice between quantity X and quality q is given by maximizing the
profits [XP(X,q) - XC(q)]-that is, by stating the two following optimization condidons:
[71 XPx(X,q) + P(X,q) - C(q) = 0
and XP4(X,q) - XCq(q) = 0.
The effect of a quota on quality is obtained by differendating totally the second first-order
condition alone. This gives
i81 dq/dX = -PyA/(P.q - Cq,).
The sign of this expression depends on the sign of Px, (since the denominator is a diagonal element of
the Hessian-that is, is negative in order to ensure the second-order conditions for a maximum.)
Nevertheless, Pxq may be positive or negative. As shown by Spence (1976, p. 419), Pxq is negadve
when 'the marginal value of quality falls as absolute willingness to pay falls, that is, wben the average
value attached to quality exceeds the marginal consumer's valuation." As a result, a quota can induce the
foreign monopolist to decrease-not increase-the optimal quality content of the goods exported.
The minimum price case can be easily introduced in the Krishna's model by restating the profit
function as [XP(X,q) - XC(q) - Xr(q)]. The new first-order conditions for a maximum profit are
[7al XPx(X,q) + P(X,q) - C(q) - r(q) = 0
9See also Da and Donnenfeld, 1987.
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and XPq(X,q) - XC,(q) - Xrq(cv = 0.
The foreign monopolist can react in three ways. It can either change the optimal quality content taking
the quantity as constant, or it can change the optimal quantity produced taking quality as constant, or it
can change both the optimal quantity and quality produced. As one wants to compare the quality effects
of the two trade measures, it is more appropriate to consider the same level of restrictions in terms of
physical units, that is, to focus on the first approach. The corresponding comparative statics require the
differentiation of the second first-order condition and give
[8a] dq/dX = -PX,/(FQ - Cqq - r.).
The sign of dq/dX is the same as in equation [81. Nevertheless, the value of dq/dx in equation [Sal can
be higher or lower than in equation [81 since it depends upon the sign of rq,. As a result, a minimum
price can induce the foreign monopolist to amplify or reduce the changes in quality content with respect
to the changes undertaken urnder a quota.
c. ghe Wd&re gffg: The Rodrfguez and the Krishna models lead to different
results in terms of optimal quality content. Nevertheless, both models come to a similar-and unusual-
result when they examine the welfare impact of the tariff or the quota. In many cases (and in all cases
in the Rodriguez model), a quota is shown unambiguously superior to a tariff. This is an unusual result
since the traditional trade literature generally suggests the welfare superiority of a tariff over a quota.
After presenting this result-and expanding it to the minimum price case-we shall examine its validity.
The two types of models will be shown to have limitations that do not make this unusual result robust.
In the interest of brevity, the presentation and discussion will focus on tne Rodrfguez model, because it
offers a more plausible framework for the Uruguayan economy (and because it leads to more striking
results.)
The Rodriguez model's proof of the unambiguous welfare-related superiority of a quota over a
tariff is as follows. A quota is welfare improving relative to a tariff because a quota increases the optimal
quality content per unit (qQ > qT = ci), and it therefore allows an overall quality level of imported
services higher than the quality level allowed by a tariff, for the same amount of nhvsical units. The
welfare gain is illustrated by the area TUBC in Figure 3b. In customs unions terminology, there is thus
a "trade creation" gain, of which TUE accrues to domestic consumers and EUBC to import quota
holders. Nevertheless, this service quality expansion generated by a quota imposes addidonal costs
(relative to those in the tariff case), because a higher quality content requires a higher unit cost of
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production. Ihis welfare loss is illustrated by the area CDPpCQ in Figure 3b. Rodrfguez shows that the
net welfare gain [TUBC - CDPFCQ1 is equal to the area tuf in Figure 3a, and is thus positive.
The same analysis can be applied to the minimum price case. A minimum price is said to be
welfare improving (that is, less costly), relative to a tariff and a quota, in that it expands the services
provided by the same amount of goods (as shown by TRB'C') and is welfare deteriorating by requiring
additional costs (as illustrated by C'DPiCR.)
How robust are these unusual results? They depend in both models on one crucial assumption:
that there will occur no reaction by the domestic firms6. When comparing the free trade and tariff cases
in the Rodriguez model, for instance, this assumption is without consequence, because foreign firms keep
the same optimal quality content in both cases (this is not always true for the Krishna model); as a result,
domestic firms have no incentives to modify the quality content of their own production sold in domestic
markets. But the same assumption creates a bias when comparing the free trade and tariff cases on the
one hand and the quota and minimum price case on the other hand. Domestic firms have incentives to
modify their optimal quality content if foreign firms have decided to change their own optimal quality
content. That domestic firms will face stronger competition in the market niches with a high quality
content impli6 adjustment costs for the domestic firms. These adjustment costs should be added to the
welfare costs of the quota or reference price, when comparing these two cases with the free trade and
tariff cases.
In sum, administered protection, through the distortion effect analyzed above, may be a serious
obstacle to the "correct" or optimal pattern of specialization. It may either induce local producers to
produce in too low a range of quality (a situation that fits well the Rodriguez or Krishna models) with
respect to their capacities determined by the country's comparative advantage, or it may induce local
firms to produce in too high a quality niche (a situation more in line with the Das and Donnenfeld model)
with respect to the country's comparative advantage.
'As mentioned by Krishna, another important limitation of these models is that they consider one good, not a product line. For
an analysis of a product line, see Krishna (1984). Reactions by domestic firms to foreign firms' decisions can be dealt with
through gans theory. Das and Donnenfeld (1989) provide such an analysis within a duopolistic maret structure. Their main
result is that tmde instrument's impact on the firms' decisions depends on the location of the firms in the quality spectrum. In
the cae where foreign finns produce the high-quality variety, the domestic firm responds by upgmding quality and expanding
saIls, but the total quantity sold to domestic cosumen declines. The global impact on welfae is thus ambiguous, because the
negaive impact on the consumer surplus-dominated by the losses in the high-qiality niche-is compensated to some degree by
the increse in the profits of the domestie monopoly.
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3. Estimates of the Ex Protection Provided by the Minimum Prce Systenm In Urugna
In Uruguay in 1981, the government decided to balance its liberalization policies by introducing
an antidumping and antisubsidy law based on GAIT rules. GAIT permits the imposition of antidumping
or countervailing duties when any import affected by unfair trading practices causes actual or potential
damage to domestic production activities. The difficulties that emerged from the formal procedures as
well as the possible threat of retaliation by other countries oon, however, led the Uruguayan government
to implement other instruments that could be more effective and allow a quicker response. First, the
reference price (RP) system that had already existed as an instrument against underinvoicing of imports
began to be used to counter dumping and subsidies. Then, in early 1983, a new and much more powerfuil
instrument was created: the minimum export price (MEP). These instruments are the major tools of
administered protection in Uruguay.
3.1 Coverag. Table 1 presents the coverage of RP and MEP protection in Uruguay in terms of the
number of general non-textile products, and in terms of the number of specialized textile tariff
position/items defined at the eight-digit level of the NADI classification in the case of textiles.
Although measures can be revised at any point during the year, Table 1 presents the coverage of the
measures on an overall yearly basis. Uruguayan administered protection covers roughly 500 products
and tariff positions. It is interesting to compare this figure with the total number of antidumping actions
undertaken by industrial countries during the same period, which was roughly 200 antidumping actions
on the part of the United States or the European Economic Community during the same period. This
proportion suggests that administered protection in Uruguay is intensive by world standards. Although
a more precise comparison would take into account he size of the import flows involved and the degree
of openness of the domestic economies, there is little doubt that even then, administered protection by
Uruguay would still be seen as broad by world standards. Changes in coverage during the 1981-1989
period differ according to the type of good involved. For nontextile products, the overall decline in the
number of cases of administered prices after 1985 has been accompanied by a marked shift from the RP
system to the MEP system. Textile items were subject o a much more stable system of reference prices
until 1987. Since then, there has been an apparent move to reduce coverage.
An altenative measure of the coverage of administered protection is the percentage of imports
under the RP or MEP systems. By this standard, goods under RP or MEP actions represented rouhly
4 percent of total Uruguayan imports (oil excluded) in 1987 and 5 percent in 1989. With either measure,
one should always bear in mind that domestic goods under RP or MEP protection systems already benefit
from higher protection than do goods that do not enjoy the additional protection of one of the two
14
Table 1. The Scope of the Administered Protection in Uruguay: 1981-1989
StOCk of measures 1981 1982 j 1983 1 1984 j 1985 1986 1987 | 1988 1989
A: Number of general products covered other than tcy jiCa
RefrenCe prica 8 34 70 95 89 70 62 54 5
Minimum export 12 18 20 25 40 40
'Tranaferted" 22 46 46 47 47 46 36 3S 35
goods [a)
Subtotal 30 80 116 154 154 136 123 129 129
B: Textile and apparel categories covered =b
Yarns 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177
Fabrics 105 1OS 105 105 105 105 105 105 105
Other textiles 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 104 82
Subtotal 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 386 364
Al product item 441 491 527 565 565 547 534 s5s 493
Source: CERES, 1989
Note: [a) Goods initially under referenee price and progresively trAnsfrred to the minimum eXPOIt price system.
[b) Number of NADI item under the RP/MEP systm.
systems. In other words, the apparently low coverage mirrors the extra protection granted to domestic
goods under RP or MEP.which introduces a systematic bias underestimating the importance of these
mechanisms. The base level apparent tariff for the sample of goods under the RP and MEP systems
examined in this secton varies from 50 percent to 58 percent on average fbr 1986, and from 39 percent
to 45 percent on average for 1989. That is higher than the 29 percent average apparent tariff imposed
on all goods imported by Uruguay in 1986'. As a result, the measurement of administered protection
based on the number or percentage of affected imports underestimates the real impact of reference price
7As of April 1989, nominlI tariffs in Uruguay ranged from 0 percent to 45 percent.
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systems on Uruguayan trade. A better indicator would be for example, that the value of textiles and
apparel products covered by RPs equals one- third of total Uruguay's value added in manufactured goods.
3.2 Measurement of the extra protection provided by the HE and ME systems in UJruguay. The
costs of administered protection enforced in Uruguay at a time that Uruguay was undertaking trade
liberalization can be disaggregated into three main components. First, the RP and MEP systems auzmint
or magnify the tariff protection against selected imports. Second, the systems C the trade
liberalization policy implemented during recent years. ITird, the systems tend to di=rt the relative
prices of cheap and expensive imports of the same item. Table 2 presents the findings that support these
conclusions.
a. Zhe Droteaion augmentaion effect. The RP and MEP systems magnify the impact of the
nominal tariffs faced by imports with prices lower than the floor prices. This effect is likely to be
substantial in that administered protection affects goods that already face relatively high nominal tariffs
of 50 percent to 58 percent in IMo6, 45 percent in 1987, 44 to 45 percent in 1988, and 37 percent to 39
percent in 1989 for the sample of nontextile goods examined here-or more than one-third of all the
nontextile items involved in administered protection. The true tariffs faced by cheap imports are thus
likely to be high.
In the case of the RP mechanism, the real tariff is derived from equation [1] above by dividing
and multiplying tF by p:
[1'J P = p(l + tca),
where -= F/p measures the protection augmentation effect introduced by the reference price mechanism.
Data made available by the Central Bank of Uruguay allow us to distinguish between transactions cleared
at prices below the floor price and transactions cleared at prices above the floor price. The average
prices of the two types of transactions have been computed for each item. Dividing the floor price by
the average price of the transactions cleared at prices lower than the floor price for each item gives the
augmentation coefficient a, which enables the real tariff ta to be computed.' Ihe average true tariffs
based on these computations are higher than the average apparent tariffs by 28.9, 27.6, 24.9, and 18.1
Te method of avenging prices for the two tpes of tnactions has the advantago f avoiding the risk of overeotmating
protection by focusing on the unactions with the lowest prices. Indeed, the price differenial betwee the two types of
tansctons ae a multiple of 2 and 3, a 'nonnal' figure by any standard.
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percentage points for 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989. Real tariffs of more than 80 percent are not rare, and
some goods have real tariffs of 150 percent or more."
For the MEP mechanism, real tariffs are obtained by computing [F(1 + t)/pl, where p is the
average price (before protection) of the transactions cleared at prices lower than the corresponding floor
price. Table 2 shows that the real tariffs introduced by the MEP mechanism are smaller than those
introduced by the RP system, although still substantial: 20.4, 4.1, 7.6, and 7.5 percentage points for
1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989 respectively.
These latter results deserve careful examination, because they seem to contradict the finding that
the MEP system is more protectionist than the RP system. The apparent contradiction arises because of
the differing coverage of the two systems. Nevertheless, by rewriting equation [21, it is
easy to show that shifting products from the RP to the MEP system generates an increase in the protection
granted:
[2'] P = p + tF + (F - p) = p(I + ta + (F - p)fp).
TIis expression shows that, all else being equal, real protection provided by the MEP system is
larger than with the RP system by the difference between the floor price and the import price as a
percentage of the import price, (F-p)/p. As a result, simply transferring a good from the RP systeto the
MEP system leads to an increase in protection since F> p for goods covered by the system.
Nevertheless, this result holds only when the apparent tariff, the transaction price, and the floor price are
constant.
Table 2 shows that one of these conditions is not likely to be met. Transaction prices will not
be constant, because the MEP system reduces-to a much greater extent than does the RP system-the
incentiv es to foreign exporters to keep their prices lower than the floor price. Under the RP system,
foreign exporters can compensate for the augmentation effect with lower c.i.f. prices. Under the MEP
system, foreign exporters offering prices lower than the floor price cannot gain any advantage by
maintaining these low prices, because the sale prices of their products on the Uruguayan markets will be
determined by floor prices and apparent tariffs, two variables over which they have no control. In such
circumstances, the lowest prices that foreign exporters will be induced to offer are close to the floor
prices. They thus keep for themselves the price difference they would have been ready to offer in the
'For television set or 'tramnsmisores everal refermnce prices were applied. The result mentioned above is based on the lowest
reference price. knun, there is not an overestimation of the augmentation effect, but a possible underesimation.
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Table 2. Protection Augmentation, Liberalization Erosion,
and Price Distortion Effects under the Reference and the Minimum Export Price Systems (selected items, 1986-1989)
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form of a lower import price or share the difference with the Uruguayan importer or user illegally (who
may be a producer.)
The average augmentation coefficient of all items under RP (1.51) is 31 percent higher than the
corresponding coefficient for all the items under MEP (1.15). Moreover, until 1988, the items under
MEP show that the augmentation coefficients actually decreased while the floor prices increased. This
evolution suggests a quick "learning' process by foreign exporters, especially since the floor price for
the same items Increased (a trend that suggests larger rather than smaller augmentation coefficients.)
Finally, the results suggest that the augmentation effect is relatively evenly distributed among
industries, with no obvious pattern of concentration of augmentation effect by industry.
b. The lbera_izaton erosfon efet. In 1986, by lowering apparent tariffs, the Umguayan
authorities resumed the policy of trade liberalization that had been suspended in 1982. As the effects just
examined suggest, however, liberalization measures are likely to have been eroded by the administered
protection based on the RP and MEP systems.
Table 2 supports this liberalization erosion hypothesis. The averages of three different types of
tariffs-apparent, global real unweighted, and global real weighted-were computed for items with at least
two consecutive years of imports. Global real tariffs are defined as the averages of the apparent tariff
for items on which transactions take place above the RP or MEP and of the real tariffs on goods whose
transactions take place below the RP or MEP. The weights are the market shares of the transactions.
The trade liberalization policy is reflected in the evolution of apparent tariffs. For goods under RP, the
average apparent tariff decreased from 58 percent in 1986 to 38 percent in 1989, and for goods under
MEP the average apparent tariff decreased from 50 percent in 1986 to 37 percent in 1989. For both
cases, however, global weighted real tariffs are 19 percent (RP) and 5 percent (MEP) higher in 1989 than
the corresponding apparent tariffs, indicating a substantial net erosion of trade liberalization.'°
c. 7he Drfce distorion Wfe. Let us assume that all the transactions below the floor price
imposed by the Uruguayan authorities are dealing with a homogeneous 'cheap variety" of the product
imported and that all the transactions above the floor price are dealing with a homogebeous "expensive
variety' of the product imported. In such a two-quality world, the RP and MEP procedures introduce
'Oft is intesetng to note that there is no sign of catching up in the RP system in tho sense that the difientia between the
appent and glb tarif, are stable over time. That is not the case in the MEP system. This result may again be caued,
however, by the pricing behavior the MEP system triggen among foreign supplier.
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a "distortion" effect between the relative prices of the two qualities. That is, they make the cheap
imported variety relatively more expensive to consumers vis-g-vis the expensive variety.
Table 2 provides a rough estimate of the likely extent of this distortion effect. The first column
shows the relative prices (unit values) of the cheap and expensive varieties of imports before protection
(that is, before tariff plus RP or MEP.) The second column shows the relative prices after protection.
Both columns present the annual averages of these relative prices computed for all the goods for which
there were available transactions. The third column shows the reductions (annual averages for all goods)
in the relative prices between the two previous columns. These reduct give an estimate of the price
distortion effect attributable to administered protection. The distortioL ; t is substantial. During the
whole period 1986-1989, the average reductions in relative prices amount to 34 percent for the goods
under the RP system, 15 percent for the products under the MEP procedure, and 27 percent for textiles.
That the distortion effects appear lower in the MEP system than in the RP system is likely to be a
consequence of the pricing behavior-the fact that firms operating under the MEP system are induced to
stick to the floor prices in order to get the maximum rents, as explained earlier-that the MEP system
generates among foreign exporters. As a result, the distortion effect is likely to be underestimated in the
case of the MEP mechanism.
3.3 The efects of minimum pricem upon Uruguayan textiles pr_duc. The case of textiles
(which here also includes apparel) is particularly important for two reasons. Under the RP system,
textiles represent a substantial percentage (roughly 33 percent in 1983) of Uruguayan value added in
manufactured goods. Moreover, textiles are subject to a particularly complex form of reference price
mechanism; reference prices for yarns are determined in the same way as reference prices for nontextile
goods, whereas reference prices for fabrics and apparel are based on reference prices imposed on the
previous stages of production, with ad hoc multiplicative coefficients.
Our analysis shows that, in terms of protection augmentation and price distortion effects, the
reference price system has a mote severe impact on textiles than on the nonwextile sector (Table 2). The
protection augmentation effect is larger for all textile products than for nontextile products-roughly 18.3
percent versus 18.1 percent under the RP system and 7.5 percent versus 7.1 percent under the MEP
system for 1989. More importantly for assessing its impact on Umguay's domestic textile industry, the
protection augmentation effect clearly reveals the existence of escalation of protection-that is, effective
protection rises with the degree of processing. The augmentation effect averages 7 percent for yarns, 16
percent for fabrics, and 25 percent for the rest of the textile products considered. The protection
20
augmentation effect provides crucial information on the relative share of the tariff and of administered
prices in the protection granted to Uruguayan producers. The fact that the apparent tariff is 40 percent
for al textile goods studied means that escalation is entirely the result of administred protection, making
the latter a substantial source of uncertainty and confusion for Uruguayan producers.
The third effect-price distortion- also exists for textiles. Again, it is more severe for textiles
than for nontextile goods: 30.5 percent versus 21.7 percent or 13.4 percent. The price distortion effect
also exhibits an escalating character: from 16 percent in yarns to 28 percent and 34 percent in fabrics
and the rest of textile goods. That the distortion effect is more severe for textiles than for nontextile
goods is a finding of great importance for a developing country, where a substantial proportion of
personal income is devoted to buying textiles and apparel.
3.4 Argentine and Brazilian Imoorts not valid rationale. The RP and MEP systems are often
presented as essential for reducing the trade-borne negative impact in the Uruguayan economy of
macroeconomic disturbances in Argentina and Brazil. This suggestion that the two systems would
primarily be applied to imports from Argentina and Brazil is not supported by available evidence, which
sugests that the RP and MEP systems are as effective against imports from the rest of the world (all
trade partners of Uruguay excluding Argentina and Brazil) as they are against imports from Argentina
and Brazil."1
First, administered protection is triggered in a substantial number of cases by exports from the
rest of the world. Of the 88 nontextile products under the RP and MEP systems, 43 have transactions
under the floor price only for exports from Argentina and Brazil, 13 for exports coming only from the
rest of the world, and 32 for exports coming from both sources. So for only 48.3 percent of products
are the RP and MEP systems triggered exclusively by exports from Argentina and Brazil, a proportion
that corresponds roughly to the relative importance of trade flows from the two sources (e.g., 38.6
percent of total Uruguayan imports were from Argentina and Brazil and 52.4 percent from the rest of the
world in 1986.) Second, the economic impact of the RP and MEP system is similar for exports coming
from Argentina and Brazil and for exports coming from the rest of the world. This is shown by the
protection augmentation effect, which on the average is similar for exports from Argentina and Brazil and
for exports from the rest of the world (see Table 3). When one considers all products, irrespective of
"In what follows, only nontexuile goods have been taken into account. Texie goods am subject o 'indirect' impors whua
Urugyans purchase these goods in Argenina and Brazil. That these indiroct impors ae genenlly consideed to be significant
(although ther is no cste) implies that the computaions done in Table 3 would be upwad biased in the cas of textiles.
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the country sources with transactions under the floor prices, the protection augmentation effect for the
rest of the world is slightly higher than the corresponding effect for Argentina and Brazil, except for the
MEP system in 1986. But when one considers only the goods in which Argentina and Brazil or the rest
of the world have transactions below the floor prices, the augmentation eff-a for goods in which all
transactions under the floor prices come from the rest of the world is systematically higher than the
corresponding augmentation effect for the transactions in which all transactions under the floor price come
from Argentina or Brazil. When one considers the MEP system alone, the impact on imports from the
rest of the world is unambiguously more severe than the impact on imports from Argentina and Brazil.
This apparently paradoxical result is explained by the fact that Argentine and Brazilian exporters are more
aware of the loopholes of the Uruguayan MEP system-that is, its capacity to generate price alignments
and rents-than are exporters from the rest of the world.
Table 3. Uruguay's Use of Reference Prices on Selected Imports from Argentdna and Brazil
versus the Rest of The World 1986-1989
-
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4. ConcluslMo
By Increasing the costs of imports, minimum prices generate the usual distortions that one expects
from tariff protection, but in an augmented way. Protection through the use of minimum prices creates
some additional negative effecs, however, that a pure tariff system would not generate. If the quality
of the goods is taken into cousideration, minimum prices distort the quality content of imports and
domestic production and exports. In a perfect competition setting, we showed that while a tariff does not
change the optimal quality content per physical unit of imports, a minimum price- and a quota as well-
lead to a quality upgrading reaction by foreign firms. In a non-competitive setting, the impact of
minimum prices on cjuality is ambiguous, because a minimum price can induce the foialip monopolist
to amplify or reduce the changes in quality content with respect to the changes undertaken under a quota.
In addition, fiurther research should assess the impact of minimum prices on the quality content chosen
by domestic producers that face stronger competition from foreign firms upgrading their own optimal
quality content. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that for many developing countries the quality upgrading
effect may actually become negative, because the upgrade may generate additional adjustments costs
related to the existing comparative advantage of the country.
In the Uruguayan case study, we showed that reference and minimum export price procedures
impose floor prices on imports covering a wide proportion (roughly more than one-third) of Uruguayan
value added in manufacturing. Overall, for goods covered, the MEP system boosts published tariffs rates
by 7 percent (a figure likely to be an underestimate) and thke RP system boosts them by 18 percent.
These systems jeopardize trade liberaiization efforts by giving the impression that tariff cuts are greater
than they in fact are. These systems also create massive distortions (from 15 percent to 30 percent)
between the relative domestic prices of the goods imported under and above the floor prices.
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